Almost debt-free · D/E 0.07OPM still 21%FY26 revenue −35%Mar-26 quarter −68% yoyCFO −₹84 Cr FY26Debtor days 223 · WC days 400Guidance DOWNGRADED
Market Cap
₹2,285 Cr
CMP (31 Jul)
₹412
P/E (ttm)
25.8
ROCE
12.7%
ROE
8.9%
D/E
0.07
Revenue FY26
₹608 Cr
PAT FY26
₹88 Cr
Debtor Days
223
WC Days
400
Order Book (Mar-26)
₹1,837 Cr
Div. Payout FY26
9%
1 · Business — what it sells, to whom
screener.in about + key points · company site
Multi-disciplinary EPC contractor in water and wastewater, headquartered in Delhi: turnkey
engineering, construction and O&M of sewage treatment plants (STPs), common effluent treatment
plants, water treatment plants, pumping stations and pipeline networks. FY25 business mix:
Water & Sewerage Projects ~70%. The customer is almost entirely the state — Jal Nigams,
municipal bodies and government authorities — which defines everything else in this dossier:
order flow arrives in tender lumps, and payment arrives when the government pays.
Moat assessment
Prequalification track record — modest: execution history qualifies it for larger tenders, but water EPC is a crowded, price-bid industry (see the eight-name peer set in §7).
No pricing power: L1 tendering; margin is won in execution and claims, not in price.
Counterparty concentration — structural: government receivables set the working-capital cycle (223 debtor days), and one client (UP Jal Nigam) is material to collections.
Model quality
Historically high-margin for EPC (OPM 21–31% across FY20–FY26) — O&M mix and claims accounting help.
Listed Sep-2023 (IPO ₹156 Cr net financing inflow visible in FY24 cash flow).
Revenue is a function of execution certificates, not demand — FY26 shows what happens when execution (or client funding) stalls.
2 · P&L quality — 7-year trend
screener.in annual P&L · consolidated
FY
Sales ₹Cr
YoY
OP ₹Cr
OPM
Other Inc ₹Cr
OI / PBT
PAT ₹Cr
EPS ₹
FY20
316
—
95
30%
7
7.1%
72
61.16
FY21
307
−2.8%
95
31%
5
5.3%
70
59.42
FY22
338
+10.1%
106
31%
4
3.9%
75
63.97
FY23
484
+43.2%
140
29%
5
3.6%
103
21.96
FY24
719
+48.6%
195
27%
15
7.4%
150
27.00
FY25
941
+30.9%
247
26%
11
4.5%
182
32.82
FY26
608
−35.4%
129
21%
12
9.5%
88
15.93
The SETL test passes — profit is operating, not treasury (other income ≤9.5% of PBT in every year).
The problem is the shape of the line: two blockbuster years into the IPO (FY23 +43%, FY24 +49%), then a
−35% collapse in FY26 back to roughly the FY26≈FY23-FY24 midpoint. 3-yr sales CAGR is +7.9% but
3-yr PAT CAGR is −5.1% (FY23→FY26, computed) — growth in the rear-view mirror is entirely the pre-listing ramp.
EPS before FY23 is not comparable (₹12 Cr equity base pre bonus/IPO). FY26 tax rate rose to 30%.
Debtor days 223 · inventory days 173 · payable days 22
Cash conversion cycle 374 days; working-capital days 400, up from 268 (screener flag)
The balance sheet is a receivables book: "other assets" grew ₹757→₹1,114 Cr over two years while fixed assets stayed flat at ~₹80 Cr and revenue fell.
Leverage & capex
Almost debt-free: D/E 0.07 (₹77 Cr borrowings vs ₹1,039 Cr net worth, computed) — the balance sheet is the one genuinely strong page.
But borrowings went 1→13→77 Cr in two years: working capital is starting to be debt-funded.
CWIP nil — no capacity bets; this is not a capex story, it is a collections story.
4 · Cash flow — the SPECTRUM test
screener.in cash-flow statement (FY20–21 not published by source)
₹Cr
FY22
FY23
FY24
FY25
FY26
CFO
17
23
−73
30
−84
CFI
−6
−19
−82
23
8
CFF
−5
−4
156
2
−1
Free cash flow
16
15
−95
24
−86
PAT (memo)
75
103
150
182
88
CFO negative in two of the last three FYs (FY24 −₹73 Cr, FY26 −₹84 Cr).
Cumulative FY22–FY26: CFO −₹87 Cr against cumulative PAT of ₹598 Cr (computed) — five years of
reported profit, not one rupee of it collected in aggregate. The FY24 hole was plugged by the IPO
(₹156 Cr financing inflow), so growth was equity-funded rather than debt-funded — SPECTRUM passes on a
technicality — but the FY26 hole is being met by rising borrowings and asset run-down. In a
government-receivables business the P&L is a claim; the cash-flow statement is the verdict.
5 · Returns — level and direction
screener.in current ratios · yearly figures computed from statements
Metric
FY24
FY25
FY26
Direction
ROCE (computed: (PBT+interest)/(net worth+debt))
~26%
~26%
~12%
halved
ROE (computed: PAT/avg net worth)
~24%
~21%
~9%
halved+
Screener current: ROCE 12.7%, ROE 8.85%. A business that earned mid-20s
returns through the IPO window now earns single-digit ROE on a bigger equity base — the FY26 revenue
collapse plus the post-IPO capital that has gone into receivables, not plant. Dividend payout has
inched up (0% → 7% → 5% → 9% FY24→FY26) but off a shrinking PAT; yield 0.36%.
6 · Shareholding — the E2E test
screener.in quarterly pattern since listing (Sep-2023)
Quarter
Promoter
FII
DII
Public
# Shareholders
Sep-23 (listing)
69.70%
7.23%
1.78%
21.28%
46,765
Mar-24
69.70%
2.78%
1.43%
26.08%
43,841
Mar-25
69.70%
0.19%
0.61%
29.51%
1,28,071
Mar-26
69.70%
0.41%
0.04%
29.84%
1,19,086
Jun-26
69.70%
0.14%
0.05%
30.10%
1,20,731
Promoter flat at 69.70% for all twelve quarters since listing — no selling into
the 2024 run-up, which passes the E2E test. (Screener's "promoter −30.3% over 3 years" flag is the pre-IPO
100% base artifact, not a post-listing sale.) The institutional story is the opposite:
FII 7.23% → 0.14% and DII 1.78% → 0.05% since listing — a complete institutional exit — while the
retail register nearly tripled to ~1.2 lakh holders. The float is now almost entirely retail.
Pledge: not reported by the source — —.
P/E 25.8 — exactly the peer median 25.8 — for the worst quarterly sales and PAT
prints in the peer table, with below-median ROCE (12.7% vs 18.9%). P/B 2.2× (book ₹187, computed).
The market is charging a median multiple for a bottom-decile year, i.e. it is pricing the order book, not
the P&L. What that requires in EPS terms is quantified in the scenario block below:
the price assumes +21.1% EPS CAGR against a credibility-adjusted −0.6%.
8 · Quarterly cadence — last 8 quarters
screener.in quarterly results · the DEEPINDS test
Quarter
Sales ₹Cr
YoY
OP ₹Cr
OPM
PAT ₹Cr
Tax %
Jun-24
204
+80.6%
50
24.3%
37
25%
Sep-24
231
+18.0%
68
29.5%
50
26%
Dec-24
242
+36.9%
70
29.0%
50
28%
Mar-25
266
+13.5%
62
23.3%
46
25%
Jun-25
211
+3.7%
51
24.3%
37
25%
Sep-25
144
−37.5%
35
24.2%
28
23%
Dec-25
169
−30.3%
27
16.1%
18
30%
Mar-26
84
−68.5%
15
18.5%
5
61%
Four consecutive down-quarters, each worse than the last, ending in a ₹84 Cr
Mar-26 quarter, −68% yoy — for an EPC company the seasonally strongest quarter (Mar-24 and
Mar-25 were both annual peaks). The Mar-26 tax rate of 61% turned ₹14 Cr of PBT into ₹5 Cr of PAT — a
one-quarter anomaly worth checking in the annual report. OPM slid from ~29% to 16–18% as fixed costs
met a shrinking revenue base. No Jun-26 (Q1 FY27) quarter has been reported yet as of this
dossier's date (01-Aug-2026) — the single most important upcoming datapoint; screener's latest row is Mar-2026.
Guidance, management record & scenarios
Guidance/scenario layer · is_guidance.py + is_scenario.py, context date 31-Jul-2026 · confidence HIGH
What management guided (FY27)
"As of March 2026, unexecuted order book at Rs. 1,837 crores. Received Rs. 209 crores from UP Jal Nigam, with three more tenders expected. Pipeline of Rs. 2,500–3,000 crores in Delhi/Maharashtra. Revenue guidance for FY27." — third-party guidance record
Bridge (named identity): the unlabelled growth figure is read as revenue growth → PAT +20% assuming flat margin → dilution +0% → EPS +20%. Bridge confidence: low — quote the bridge, not just the output.
Guidance grade: DOWNGRADED · management grade: "hype man" → credibility multiplier ×0.675 applied by the scenario model.
Scenario block (at ₹409, 31-Jul)
Case
EPS g
EPS T
Exit ×
Target
CAGR
Bear
−16.6%
6.57
13.0
₹85
−26.9%
Base
−0.6%
15.80
17.0
₹269
−8.1%
Bull
+10.6%
26.95
23.0
₹620
+8.7%
Priced in: the ₹409 price assumes +21.1% EPS CAGR at a 17× exit (for a +12% return),
while the credibility-adjusted growth is −0.6% — a gap of −21.7 points. IS's own XIRR
bear/base/bull: +0.9% / +31.8% / +46.9%; this model's base sits −39.9% below theirs.
Quality score 5.0/10 (ROE 8.8% below bar) · Stage 2 · RS 77. Confidence: HIGH.
Order-book context: unexecuted ₹1,837 Cr ≈ 3.0× FY26 revenue (computed). ₹209 Cr received
from UP Jal Nigam. The claimed ₹2,500–3,000 Cr Delhi/Maharashtra pipeline is a management claim, not an award.
A "hype man" grade means guided-vs-delivered has historically favoured the guidance, not the delivery — and FY27
guidance itself was downgraded.
⚡ 9 · CONSOLIDATED VIEW THESIS
Research Reference Only — Not an Investment Recommendation · Primaegis Research Pipeline
💡 THE HONEST PARAGRAPH
To own EMS at ₹412 you have to believe that FY26 was an air-pocket, not a repricing:
that the ₹1,837 Cr unexecuted order book (~3× FY26 revenue) converts back into ₹900 Cr-class execution once
government funding flows, that the ₹209 Cr UP Jal Nigam receipt is the start of a collections cycle rather than
a one-off, and that 21% margins survive the restart. The tape against that belief is heavy: a −35% revenue year
ending in a −68% quarter, CFO negative in two of the last three years with five-year cumulative CFO of −₹87 Cr
against ₹598 Cr of reported PAT, working capital at 400 days and rising, a complete FII/DII exit into a retail
register, and a management graded "hype man" whose FY27 guidance was just downgraded. The order book is real;
so was the order book in FY26, and revenue still halved — an order book is an option on government
cash-release, and the market is paying a peer-median 25.8× as if the option were already exercised. The
balance sheet (D/E 0.07) buys survival time, not a thesis. Thesis breaks are already visible; thesis
confirmation (a reported Jun-26 quarter with revenue and CFO recovery) does not exist yet.
📊 PROS (feed the weekly strip)
Nearly debt-free
D/E 0.07; ₹1,039 Cr net worth funds the working-capital siege. Source: §3
Margins intact through the crash
FY26 OPM 21% — the collapse is volume, not price. Source: §2
The third-party corpus tags the chart Stage 2 with RS 77 (+7.3% on 31-Jul) while the fundamentals print a four-quarter execution slide — momentum is trading the order-book story ahead of any delivery evidence.
⚠️ WHAT BREAKS / WHAT CONFIRMS
Breaks it further
a weak or delayed Jun-26 print; another negative-CFO half; borrowings compounding past ₹100 Cr; any pledge disclosure
Would confirm the bull case
Jun-26 revenue >₹200 Cr with positive CFO; Delhi/Maharashtra pipeline converting to signed awards (Reg-30 filings); debtor days back under 150
Tax anomaly
Mar-26's 61% tax quarter — verify in the FY26 annual report
🎯 RESEARCH WATCHLIST VERDICT
STAND ASIDE
🔑 Catalyst: Jun-26 (Q1 FY27) results — the first evidence either way
⏱ Re-examine: after Q1 FY27 print + CFO for H1 FY27
Research tracking priority only — not a buy/sell/hold recommendation per SEBI (RA) Regulations 2014
Primaegis Research Opinion · Internal Analyst View
⚠️ This is an internal, unregulated analytical opinion of Primaegis Research for internal pipeline
use only. It does NOT constitute a SEBI-regulated investment recommendation, research report, or
solicitation to buy, sell, or hold any security. Consult a SEBI-registered investment advisor before
making any financial decision.
⚠️ IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
This document is a research and educational output only, generated by the Primaegis Research
Company Dossier Pipeline (fallback path). Neither the author nor any contributor to this report is a
SEBI registered investment advisor or research analyst. Nothing in this report constitutes
investment advice, a research recommendation, or a solicitation to buy, sell, or hold any security,
fund, or financial instrument under SEBI (Research Analyst) Regulations, 2014 or any other
applicable law. All financial data is sourced from publicly available disclosures (screener.in,
NSE/BSE filings, company releases) and the third-party guidance/scenario layer;
figures marked "computed" are derived from those sources; anything unsourced renders as a dash.
Scenario targets are model outputs quoted from a third party for research context, not price
targets or recommendations. Always conduct your own due diligence and consult a SEBI registered
investment advisor before making any financial decision. Generated: 2026-08-01 | Primaegis Research · Not for distribution.