FY26 sales +24% (standalone)OPM 21% → 12%Other income ~70% of PBTCFO −₹713 Cr · borrowings ×1.9P/E 67 on ROE 4.5%FY27 pre-sales aim ₹9,000 Cr (IS)
Market Cap
₹18,924 Cr
CMP (31-Jul)
₹580
ROCE
5.8%
ROE
4.5%
P/E (ttm)
67.4
FY26 Sales (stdl.)
₹2,624 Cr
FY26 PAT (stdl.)
₹277 Cr
FY26 CFO
−₹713 Cr
D/E
0.48
Promoter
41.1%
Read this first — the lens problem
Everything screener.in serves for this name is the standalone P&L: FY26 revenue ₹2,624 Cr, PAT ₹277 Cr.
The economics of Brigade, however, run through consolidated pre-sales — ₹7,424 Cr in FY26 per the guidance corpus
guidance layer (third-party), with FY26 consolidated revenue of ₹5,697 Cr referenced in the same layer's EPS bridge.
Much of the delivery sits in subsidiaries, JVs and the leasing/hospitality entities the standalone statement barely touches.
Every ratio below (ROE 4.5%, P/E 67, OPM 12%) is computed on the narrow lens. That mismatch is not a footnote to this
dossier — it is the analysis. The standalone numbers cannot prove the bull case, and the pre-sales number cannot excuse
the standalone cash burn; both statements are held in view throughout.
1 · Business — what it sells, to whom
screener.in "about" + key points
Established 1986, Bengaluru-based South-India real estate developer expanding into other parts of India.
Has completed 250+ buildings aggregating 70+ mn sq ft (company milestone counts run to 300+ buildings / 100+ mn sq ft
serving 40,000+ customers) across residential, offices, retail and hospitality in Bengaluru, Mysuru, Chennai,
Ahmedabad, Hyderabad and Kochi. Among the top-10 listed Indian developers by market cap.
Position
Geographic moat — regional: a Bengaluru-anchored land bank and brand in the strongest residential market of this cycle; not a national franchise like DLF/Lodha.
Mixed model: for-sale residential (cyclical, pre-sales driven) plus annuity offices/retail and hotels (capital-heavy, slower).
What the model implies
Revenue recognition lags pre-sales by years (possession-linked) — the P&L is a rear-view mirror of launches from 2–4 years ago.
Growth requires land + launch spend today against recognition later — exactly the FY26 cash-flow shape seen in §4.
2 · P&L quality — the SETL test
screener.in annual P&L (standalone lens) · SETL: is the profit operating or treasury?
FY
Sales ₹Cr
YoY
OP ₹Cr
OPM
Other Inc ₹Cr
PBT ₹Cr
PAT ₹Cr
EPS ₹
FY22
2,161
+41.8%
520
24%
140
433
309
10.06
FY23
2,209
+2.2%
469
21%
247
502
385
12.52
FY24
2,025
−8.3%
453
22%
199
429
318
10.33
FY25
2,117
+4.5%
435
21%
267
492
455*
13.97
FY26
2,624
+24.0%
321
12%
259
368
277
8.51
*FY25 PAT flattered by an 8% effective tax year (incl. a −23% tax quarter in Mar-25). Screener flags 5-yr sales growth of just 11.5%.
SETL test — fails loudly
FY26 other income of ₹259 Cr against PBT of ₹368 Cr — ~70% of pre-tax profit is not operating profit. This is
not a one-off: other income has run ₹199–267 Cr every year since FY23 while operating profit fell from ₹520 Cr to ₹321 Cr.
Headline FY26 sales grew +24%, but OPM halved from 21% to 12% — so the incremental revenue came in at near-zero
incremental operating margin (some of this is the standalone entity recognising low-margin projects; the consolidated picture
is not visible here). 3-yr PAT CAGR is −10.4% (₹385 Cr FY23 → ₹277 Cr FY26). On the lens available, earnings are
shrinking and increasingly treasury-flavoured.
3 · Balance sheet — D/E, working capital, capex bets
screener.in balance sheet + ratios · FY26
Item
FY26 ₹Cr
FY25 ₹Cr
FY24 ₹Cr
Equity capital + reserves
6,344
6,115
4,220
Borrowings
3,064
1,588
1,746
Other liabilities
8,062
6,188
4,582
Fixed assets
3,460
2,798
1,340
CWIP
6
0
670
Investments
2,511
2,421
2,544
Other assets
11,492
8,671
5,994
Total assets
17,470
13,891
10,548
D/E 0.48 (₹3,064 Cr / ₹6,344 Cr net worth) — still moderate for a developer, but the direction is the story: borrowings nearly doubled in one year, ₹1,588 → ₹3,064 Cr (+93%), immediately after the FY25 equity raise (reserves jumped ₹3,989 → ₹5,871 Cr; equity capital 231 → 244 Cr).
Working capital cycle (screener, Mar-26): debtor days 54 · working-capital days 59 · cash-conversion 54. Inventory days — (not served). "Other assets" +₹2,821 Cr YoY is where the land/inventory build lives.
Capex bets: FY24's ₹670 Cr CWIP was commissioned into fixed assets by FY25 (1,340 → 2,798 Cr) — annuity/hospitality assets now on book, CWIP back to ~nil. Balance-sheet expansion of +₹3,579 Cr in FY26 is inventory-and-debt, not construction-in-progress.
4 · Cash flow — the SPECTRUM test
screener.in cash flow · SPECTRUM: is growth funded by the business or by debt?
FY
CFO ₹Cr
PAT ₹Cr
CFO/OP
CFI ₹Cr
CFF ₹Cr
FCF ₹Cr
FY22
534
309
118%
−583
123
519
FY23
283
385
81%
72
−360
244
FY24
−25
318
20%
−120
151
−83
FY25
332
455
119%
−413
1,096
−47
FY26
−713
277
−156%
−545
943
−1,193
SPECTRUM test — growth is debt-funded
Five-year CFO totals ₹411 Cr against ₹1,744 Cr of reported PAT (~24% conversion), and the last three years read
−25 / +332 / −713. FY26 is the clearest possible signature of a debt-funded land-and-launch cycle bet: CFO −₹713 Cr,
investing −₹545 Cr, plugged by +₹943 Cr of financing while borrowings went 1,588 → 3,064 Cr. FCF −₹1,193 Cr. For a developer,
spending ahead of a launch cycle is a legitimate strategy — but it means today's P&L profits are accrual, the cash is going
out the door, and the bet only settles if FY27–28 pre-sales convert to collections. The FY25 equity raise plus FY26 debt
doubling is two consecutive years of external funding.
5 · Returns — ROCE / ROE level and direction
screener.in ratios
Metric
Value
Context
ROE (FY26)
4.51%
3-yr average 6.8% (screener) — below fixed-deposit territory
ROCE (FY26)
5.82%
lowest of the eight major listed developers (peer table §7); Lodha 16.4%, Oberoi 17.3%
Direction
Falling
EPS ₹12.52 (FY23) → ₹8.51 (FY26); capital base doubled (assets ₹9,142 → ₹17,470 Cr) while operating profit fell
The denominator grew through the QIP and debt while the standalone numerator shrank —
returns on this lens are low and deteriorating. If consolidated recognition catches up with pre-sales, the ratios would
re-rate mechanically; that is the belief being priced, not the number being reported.
6 · Shareholding — the E2E test
screener.in quarterly pattern · E2E: is the promoter selling into the price?
Quarter
Promoter %
FII %
DII %
Public %
Holders
Sep-23
43.77
13.40
25.41
17.44
63,535
Mar-24
43.73
14.86
23.84
17.58
76,977
Sep-24
41.37
18.47
24.02
16.14
86,803
Mar-25
41.14
20.21
22.87
15.77
1,28,008
Sep-25
41.13
18.67
23.28
16.95
1,74,585
Mar-26
41.11
16.75
24.74
17.40
1,59,254
Jun-26
41.10
15.63
25.46
17.80
1,62,943
E2E verdict — no promoter selling signature. The 43.7% → 41.4% step in Sep-24 coincides with the FY25 equity-capital increase (₹231 → ₹244 Cr), i.e. dilution from the fresh issue, not observed promoter exits; since then the drift is 41.37 → 41.10 over seven quarters. Pledge — not reported by this source.
FIIs have sold for six straight quarters — 20.23% (Dec-24) → 15.63% (Jun-26) — through the very period the debt-funded expansion accelerated. DIIs absorbed most of it (22.87 → 25.46%).
Retail holder count is up 2.6× in under three years (63.5k → 162.9k) — the register has moved from institutions toward the crowd.
7 · Valuation — what the price assumes
screener.in ratios + peer table
Peer
CMP ₹
P/E
Mkt Cap ₹Cr
ROCE %
Qtr sales var %
DLF
659
39.0
1,63,197
6.3
−42.0
Lodha Developers
1,244
30.1
1,24,287
16.4
+43.1
Prestige Estates
1,616
61.1
69,615
10.4
+15.9
Phoenix Mills
1,893
52.2
67,716
12.8
+12.8
Oberoi Realty
1,828
25.1
66,456
17.3
+31.7
Godrej Properties
2,106
39.4
63,429
7.6
+63.0
Anant Raj
625
40.5
22,474
12.1
+19.6
Brigade Enterprises
580
67.4
18,924
5.8
+31.8
Industry median (88 cos)
—
27.0
—
7.7
+22.0
P/E 67.4 — the richest of the eight majors, on the lowest ROCE of the eight. Sector median 27×. P/B 2.97 (₹580 / BV ₹195); screener itself flags "trading at 2.98× book".
The multiple is only defensible if you refuse the standalone denominator: on standalone EPS of ₹8.51 the price assumes a multi-year consolidated recognition surge that the reported statements have not yet shown. The peer set prices proven consolidated delivery (Lodha 30×, Oberoi 25×) below Brigade's unproven one.
Guidance & scenario
is_guidance.py / is_scenario.py · context date 2026-07-31 · not company-verified; quoted as third-party research input
What management guided
"Aiming for INR9,000 crores in FY27 pre-sales (20% growth over FY26's INR7,424 crores)" — guidance grade
upgraded, management record mixed. The layer's EPS bridge (accounting identity, medium
confidence): treating the ₹9,000 Cr as an absolute revenue target against FY26's ₹5,697 Cr consolidated revenue over one year
implies PAT +58% · dilution +2% · EPS +56%. Note the category slip inside that bridge: pre-sales are bookings, not
revenue — the identity is only as good as the conversion assumption, so treat the +56% as an upper-bound arithmetic echo of
the target, not a forecast.
Scenario block — targets withheld (degenerate for this name)
The scenario model scored BRIGADE at medium confidence with its growth anchors disagreeing by ~60
percentage points (third-party corpus +23.0% · street consensus +3.9% across 13 estimates · own history +63.7%), on a collapsed
exit multiple. Its bear/base/bull price targets are not printed here: the anchors disagree too widely to be usable for a
realty developer whose screener P&L is standalone while pre-sales are the economic driver — the model's EPS base (standalone
FY26 ₹26.36 as fed, vs ₹8.51 on the screener lens above — even the base year is contested between lenses) and its exit multiple
both collapse under the standalone/consolidated mismatch. The same defect invalidates the model's "priced-in" line. Quality
score from the layer: 3.0/10 (ROE and ROCE below bar) — that much, at least, agrees with §5.
Lumpy by construction — possession-linked recognition swings sales −28% to +69% YoY; no clean seasonality.
DEEPINDS flags: Mar-25's ₹208 Cr PAT rode a −23% tax quarter (a credit, not operations) — it made FY25's PAT and today's "PAT growth −58% YoY" optics. Sep-25 printed a 4.7% OPM quarter — near-zero operating margin on ₹661 Cr of recognition. In two of the eight quarters (Sep-24, Sep-25), other income exceeded operating profit.
H2 FY26 (Dec + Mar) shows recognition accelerating (+31% YoY both quarters) with OPM recovering to 15–17% — the first supportive evidence for the "recognition catches up" thesis, though still well below the 21–25% prints of FY25.
⚡ 9 · CONSOLIDATED VIEW THESIS
Research Reference Only — Not an Investment Recommendation · Primaegis Research Pipeline
💡 THE HONEST PARAGRAPH
To own Brigade at ₹580 you have to believe three things at once: that FY26's ₹7,424 Cr of
consolidated pre-sales (third-party guidance corpus) and the guided ₹9,000 Cr for FY27 will convert into consolidated revenue and
collections over FY27–29; that the −₹713 Cr CFO and near-doubled borrowings are a land-and-launch cycle investment that
those collections will repay; and that the standalone statements screener serves — OPM halved to 12%, other income at ~70% of
PBT, 3-yr PAT CAGR −10.4%, ROE 4.5% — are a recognition-lag artefact rather than the truth of the business. None of those
beliefs is disprovable today, which is precisely the problem: at 67× the market has already paid for all three, priced above
every peer that has proven consolidated delivery. The guidance is "upgraded" but the management record is graded "mixed",
the scenario model's anchors disagree by ~60 points, and FIIs have sold for six consecutive quarters into a register that added
100,000 retail holders. The thesis breaks if FY27 collections disappoint (debt then compounds against a 12%-OPM P&L), if the
Bengaluru residential cycle cools, or if two more quarters pass without consolidated recognition visibly closing the gap.
Fundamentals (standalone lens) vs Economic driver (pre-sales)
DIVERGENT
The reported statements and the bull case are looking at different companies. Until consolidated recognition closes the gap, every headline ratio on this name is measuring the wrong thing — in both directions.
⚠️ PRIMARY RISKS TO THESIS
Collection shortfall
if pre-sales don't convert, FY26's debt doubling compounds against a 12%-OPM standalone P&L
Cycle turn
a Bengaluru residential cool-off hits launches, pricing and the land bank marked into "other assets" simultaneously
De-rating gravity
67× → sector-median 27× requires no bad news at all — only time without proof
🎯 RESEARCH WATCHLIST VERDICT
WATCH — DO NOT CHASE
🔑 Catalyst: Q1/Q2 FY27 consolidated collections + CFO print; pre-sales run-rate vs the ₹9,000 Cr aim
⏱ Horizon: re-assess at H1 FY27 results
Research tracking priority only — not a buy/sell/hold recommendation per SEBI (RA) Regulations 2014
Primaegis Research Opinion · Internal Analyst View
NEUTRAL (HOLD)
📊 Conviction: Low — the two data lenses contradict each other and neither can currently be verified against the other · ⏱ Horizon: event-driven (H1 FY27)
🔄 Would upgrade if: consolidated CFO turns positive while pre-sales hold the ₹9,000 Cr path. Would downgrade if: borrowings rise again in H1 FY27 or another sub-5% OPM quarter prints.
⚠️ This is an internal, unregulated analytical opinion of Primaegis Research for internal pipeline
use only. It does NOT constitute a SEBI-regulated investment recommendation, research report, or
solicitation to buy, sell, or hold any security. Consult a SEBI-registered investment advisor before
making any financial decision.
⚠️ IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
This document is a research and educational output only, generated by the Primaegis Research company-dossier
pipeline (fallback path). Neither the author nor any contributor to this report is a SEBI registered investment
advisor or research analyst. Nothing in this report constitutes investment advice, a research recommendation, or a
solicitation to buy, sell, or hold any security, fund, or financial instrument under SEBI (Research Analyst)
Regulations, 2014 or any other applicable law. All financial data is sourced from publicly available disclosures
(screener.in — standalone statements) and the third-party guidance/scenario layer as labelled; figures
that could not be sourced are shown as a dash, never estimated. Guidance and pre-sales figures are third-party
reported and not independently verified against company filings in this run. Always conduct your own due diligence
and consult a SEBI registered investment advisor before making any financial decision. Generated: 2026-08-01 | Primaegis Research · Not for distribution.